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ABSTRACT
Attribution of responsibility and blame are important topics
in political science especially as individuals tend to think of
political issues in terms of questions of responsibility, and as
blame carries far more weight in voting behavior than that
of credit. However, surprisingly, there is a paucity of studies
on the attribution of responsibility and blame in the field of
disaster research.
The Flint water crisis is a story of government failure at all
levels. By studying microblog posts about it, we understand
how citizens assign responsibility and blame regarding such
a man-made disaster online. We form hypotheses based on
social scientific theories in disaster research and then oper-
ationalize them on unobtrusive, observational social media
data. In particular, we investigate the following phenom-
ena: the source for blame; the partisan predisposition; the
concerned geographies; and the contagion of complaining.
This paper adds to the sociology of disasters research by
exploiting a new, rarely used data source (the social web),
and by employing new computational methods (such as
sentiment analysis and retrospective cohort study design) on
this new form of data. In this regard, this work should be seen
as the first step toward drawing more challenging inferences
on the sociology of disasters from “big social data”.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade of disaster research, there has been a prolif-
eration of studies exploiting information and communication
technologies (ICT) and computational methods for advanc-
ing emergency response. These same means can be used to
address social scientific inquiries of disaster research. In this
regard, instead of trying to solve a software engineering or a
disaster management problem, here we study the sociology
of disasters from a computational social science perspective.
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By examining microblog posts on the Flint water crisis we
try to understand how citizens respond to a man-made dis-
aster and to a governmental failure online. In particular we
are interested in responses regarding attribution of blame
and responsibility, which usually takes place in the recovery
phase of disasters. To study it, we first construct theoretical
hypotheses on top of existing social theories, and then oper-
ationalize them on unobtrusive, observational social media
data via computational methods.
Attribution of responsibility is a key issue in political de-
cision making as blame carries far more weight in voting
behavior than that of credit [19]. Moreover, “individuals
tend to simplify political issues by reducing them to ques-
tions of responsibility and their issue opinions flow from
their answers to these questions” [13]. Besides, attributions
formed during states of national emergencies are of particular
importance, especially because these attributions become
shared memories of the entire nation and are long used as
concrete examples of severity of consequences of wrong policy
decisions. Although about thirty years ago Neal found it
surprising that the process of blame was a neglected topic
in disaster research [22], tracing over the citations that his
paper has received to date and still not seeing any article
particularly discussing blame, made us even more worrisome.
In this paper, we contribute to this neglected field by testing
theories of attribution of blame and responsibility on the
Flint water crisis using new forms of data (the social web)
and methods. In particular, we add to the disaster research
by addressing the issues of: i) sources for blame regarding a
disaster, ii) partisan predispositions in the blaming behavior,
iii) geographies that shows interest in the crisis the most,
and iv) the contagion of complaining (homophily, peer or
network effect, and selective exposure).
In the next section we first provide some background infor-
mation about the Flint water crisis. Following it, we lay out
our hypotheses along with the theories behind them. After
that we describe the data and discuss how we operationalize
our hypotheses. In the fifth section, we report and assess
our results. Finally, we conclude our paper.
2. BACKGROUND
On Saturday, January 16, 2016, President Obama declared
a federal state of emergency for an area in Michigan affected
by contaminated water and authorized the Department of
Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) to “coordinate all disaster relief efforts” [25]. When
he later visited Flint, the most adversely affected city in
Genesee County, he described the water crisis as “a man-
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made disaster” that was “avoidable” and “preventable” [29],
while not naming who in particular were responsible.
For decades, Flint, MI used Detroit’s treated sources for
tap water. However, Detroit’s double digit price increases
every year has eventually made it the most expensive option
[26], and on March 25, 2014 Flint city council approved
buying water from Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA)
when it becomes active. Upon this decision the “water war”
started according to Detroit Water and Sewerage Department
(DWSD), and DSDW gave a notice that it would terminate
its contract with Flint in one year [5, 10]. Flint had to
find a temporary primary water source until KWA becomes
effective, and by late April 2014, they decided to switch to
Flint River temporarily. Reportedly the complaints about
the tap water started right after this change [9].
According to Flint Water Advisory Task Force (FWATF) [9],
the following seven entities are responsible for the Flint water
crisis at various levels: Michigan Department of Environ-
mental Quality (MDEQ), Michigan Department of Health
and Human Services (MDHHS), Michigan Governor’s Of-
fice, State-appointed emergency managers (EMs), Genesee
County Health Department’s (GCHD), and U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA).
3. HYPOTHESES
In “An Inventory of Sociological Findings”, Drabek [6] dis-
cusses “blame assignation processes” at the community-level
in the disaster reconstruction phase of his typology, in which
he lists hypotheses on three topics: (i) when blame occurs,
(ii) purposes of blaming and how they work out, and (iii)
who those blamers are. Here, we build our hypotheses on top
of this existing sociology of disasters research. Drabek also
notes the scarcity of studies on blame assignment behavior
in disaster research, by forming and testing hypotheses we
hope our research helps reduce this gap of knowledge in the
field.
Source for Blame. “Animated by a desire for prevention
of future occurrences”, blame occurs especially when (i)
conventional explanations failed, (ii) when the responsible
agents are perceived to be unwilling to take action to remedy
the situation, and (iii) when they violate moral standards [4].
All of the conditions are present in the case of Flint water
crisis; (i) there is no conventional explanation for this man-
made disaster, (ii) almost all of the agents of responsibility
were reluctant to respond in time, and (iii) the public was
deprived of a basic human right, the right to safe water.
Yet, per condition (ii), every primarily responsible officer
in the state “somehow payed the price” by leaving their
posts, but Governor Snyder1 [9]. Moreover, both Democratic
presidential candidates demanded the governor to resign.
Therefore, our first hypothesis goes:
H1. The amount of blame directed toward Governor Snyder
exceeds any other agent.
Partisan Predisposition. Blaming an entire party or an
ideology upon a particular crisis predisposes him against that
party. In disasters, sometimes blame is not seen as “a function
of the immediate crisis, but that reflect pre-existing conflicts
and hostilities”, and when biased or irrational factors play
a role in the process of blaming, it is called “scapegoating”
1They either resigned (e.g. EPA officials and emergency
managers), were fired (e.g. the head of MDEQ’s drinking
water unit), or their effective terms ended (e.g. the mayor).
[31] (cited in [6]). One can relate this to the social identity
theory, which suggests that if someone is guilty then (s)he
must be among the out-group [30]. Theories on partisan bias
project this socio-psychological bias onto the political plane,
suggesting that partisanship has an important influence on
attitudes toward political elements [2]. So we expect people
blaming a particular party or ideology to express more nega-
tive sentiments toward representatives of that party. In our
case, some of these representatives are Democrat while others
are Republican2, and for some, Flint poisoning is primarily
a partisan issue (e.g. [15]). Hence, our second hypothesis is:
H2a. Individuals who assign responsibility to the Republican
party or ideology show greater negative feeling toward the
Governor (R) than those who blame Democratic party or
ideology.
H2b. Individuals who assign responsibility to the Republi-
can party or ideology express less negative sentiment toward
the Mayor (D) than those who blame Democratic party or
ideology.
Concerned Geographies. Tobler’s first law of geography
says “everything is related to everything else, but near things
are more related than distant things” [34]. In the case of Flint
water crisis, this also relates to environmental vulnerability,
suggesting that individuals who are at greater risk are more
likely to express their concerns. Flint residents are under the
highest threat, followed by the Genesee residents, followed
by Michiganders. Therefore we expect:
H3. Expression of concern per capita is to be the highest
for the city of Flint, followed by other cities in the Genesee
county, followed by other cities and counties in Michigan.
Contagion of Complaining. Twitter is not only used as
a social network but also as a news media [17]. In the former
case, individuals befriend with similar others (homophily)
and influence each other [21]. When Twitter serves as a news
media, we expect ideological similarity between the user and
who he follows as selective exposure suggests [28]. Besides,
one who hears a complaint is more likely to start complaining
(positive feedback), and Kowalski offers three explanations
for this in times of disasters [14]. Accordingly:
H4. Individuals who express negative emotions on the Flint
water crisis have friends more negative than that of individ-
uals who talk more positively about the crisis.
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
One of the major advantages of social media research is that
we are not bounded with a specific space and time for data
collection. This helped us overcome a major limitation in
disaster research, unobservability, as Wallace puts it [35]: “An
anthropologist can watch or participate in a religious ritual;
a sociologist can attend a union meeting; the psychiatrist can
see his patient a few hours or minutes after a family quarrel.
But disasters, generally speaking, are so unpredictable as
to place and time, that it is unlikely that any given team
of trained observers will be in an impact area, before and
during an impact of the appropriate type”. Palen et al. [24]
also emphasize the advantages of crisis informatics in quick
response research. On the other hand, availability of big
data may also obscure the most relevant piece of information
needed for an accurate conclusion [32]. To this extent, in
2The city council is made up of Democrats, the state of
Michigan is ruled by a Republican governor, the Congress is
controlled by Republicans, and the President is a Democrat.
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Gov. Rick Snyder holds a news conf.
Groups file a federal lawsuit
First Flint hearing in Congress
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GOP debate in Detroit,MI
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for both parties
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Gov Snyder asks the lawsuit be dismissed Obama visits Flint
Figure 1: Twitter activity on the Flint water crisis.
order to have most possible amount of data, we do not
restrict ourselves to tweets with geocoded information or
that contain a particular hashtag only. Furthermore, to not
include irrelevant postings, we filter the Twitter stream by
keywords Flint and #FlintWaterCrisis.
We used TweetTracker [16] as our data collection tool, and
the data collected starts on the day before the President
declared a state of emergency for Flint. From Jan. 15 to
Jun. 29, 2016 (163 days3), we obtained 664,775 tweets by
281,535 unique users. Fig. 1 illustrates the activity on Twitter
by highlighting some of the major events that draw public’s
attention4. It appears that the public interest in the Flint
water crisis has been limited, and peaked at times of major
political events. In this regard, the only day we hit the
50,000 daily tweet collection limit of TweetTracker was the
day of the Democratic presidential debate that was held in
Flint on March 6. We calculated sentiments of the tweets in
our dataset using NLTK implementation of VADER because
it is particularly designed for sentiment analysis for social
media text5 [3, 12]. In the rest of this section, we discuss how
we operationalize the theoretical hypotheses put forward in
Sec. 3.
Source for Blame. Our first hypothesis questions whether
most of the blames are directed towards Governor Snyder.
To learn if a tweet, or a phrase in a tweet, attributes blame or
responsibility to any specific person or a group, we employed
manual curation. First, based on the roles of government
entities in the Flint water crisis listed in Sec. 2 and from our
preliminary observation of our dataset we came up with eight
candidates that are likely to be blamed. Then, we randomly
selected five chunks of 200 tweets from our original dataset
and asked voluntary coders6 to label every tweet in a chunk
with at least one of these predefined labels (candidates).
If there is no blame attributed to any specific person or a
group in a tweet, then it is labeled no blame. If a person or
group is blamed but happens not to be in the candidates list,
3Data for the following days are missing due to collection
issues: 01:23,24; 02:14,17-19; 04:28-30; 05:1-3,7,13-25
4Since there is no major political event taking place after
the President’s visit on May 4th, we truncate the figure for
the sake of better visualization
5VADER’s sentiment lexicon includes emoticons, common
slang words, and accounts for punctuation and capitalization.
6Three of the coders (Lawrence Wang, Varun Talwar, and
Elizabeth Hu) are 2016 Summer interns in the Department
of Computational and Data Sciences at George Mason Uni-
versity, and the other two (Feyza Galip and Kevser Polater)
are graduate students elsewhere.
then those tweets are labeled as other. Multiple labeling
was allowed in case a tweet assigns blame to several persons
or groups. Curators were instructed not to label a tweet
if they are unsure of the person blamed, and to indicate
so. Distribution of these eleven cases is captured in Fig. 2.
To measure inter-rater reliability, each of the samples is
created with approximately 10% overlap with any other
sample (σ = 19.1, µ = 2.5).7 Then, to operationalize our
first hypothesis we simply evaluate the number of tweets
coded per category by the curators, for which we calculate
a Fleiss’ kappa statistic for every possible coder pair. As
visualized in the heatmap in Fig. 2, most of the rater pairs
are in the 0.41–0.60 kappa range, which is interpreted as
moderate agreement8 [18].
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Figure 2: Agents blamed and inter-rater agreement.
Partisan Predisposition. Our second hypothesis is about
the relationship between explicitly blamed parties or ideolo-
gies and the sentiments expressed toward their representa-
tives at administrative positions. We expect users who blame
the Republican (Democratic) party or ideology to have a
more negative sentiment towards the Republican governor
(Democratic mayor) than those who blame the Democratic
(Republican) party or ideology. In our manually coded tweets
sample (Fig. 2) two of the labels indicate tweets explicitly
blaming parties or ideologies. A total of 62 (24) of the 892
labeled tweets found to be blaming Republicans (Democrats)
for the crisis. After identifying these tweets, we look for the
7Therefore, instead of 1000 tweets we ended up with 892
unique tweets labeled in total.
8That is,
(5
2
)
= 10 pairs calculated. A perfect agreement
would equate to a kappa of 1, and a chance agreement would
equate to 0.
individuals (Twitter accounts) who (re)tweeted at least one
of those tweets. In total, 165 such users are identified in our
main dataset, 136 of which blamed the Republicans, and 29
blamed the Democrats.
We used keyword filtering to identify the tweets mentioning
the governor of Michigan (G), the mayor of Flint (M), and
the emergency managers (EM)9, and then selected tweets
exclusively mentioning the mayor or the governor as such:
LetMo :=M \ (G∪EM) represent the set of tweets that has
only mayor-related tweets. Similarly, Go := G \ (M ∪ EM)
gives the exclusively governor-related tweets. Within each of
those sets, we looked at the sentiments of individuals blaming
Republicans (R) and Democrats (D) separately. To measure
statistical difference between those who blame R and D in
their sentiments expressed toward G and M, we performed
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is a non-parametric test
that does not rely on any probability distribution.
Concerned Geographies. Rather than working with
geocoded tweets, which are rarely available for our collection,
we make use of the location field in Twitter user profiles,
from which we managed to get geographic coordinates using
regular expressions. Then to measure cities’ level of interest
in the Flint water crisis, we normalize total number of tweets
originated at each city by its population. For counties, we
normalize total tweet counts originated from cities in a
county with the square root of sum of city populations. We
do square root transformation to account for larger standard
deviations at county level10.
Contagion of Complaining. Some Flinters have posted
positive messages about the crisis (cohort), while most oth-
ers have expressed negative sentiments (control). We expect
friends of a user in any of these two groups reflect sentiments
similar to the user. To test this hypothesis, we designed a ret-
rospective cohort study in which we compared the sentiments
of the friends of the cohort group on the Flint water crisis to
that of the control group. To rule out the geographic effect,
we form both of the groups only by Flinters, the Flinters
that have at least three but no more than 20 tweets in our
dataset.11 We found 223 such Flinters in our dataset (115 of
who had a negative and 101 of who had a positive sentiment
on average on the Flint water crisis)12. We then performed
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test that rejects
the null hypothesis if the two samples (the average senti-
ments of the friends of each group) were drawn from the
same distribution.
5. RESULTS
Source for Blame. As shown in Fig. 2, the Governor of
Michigan is blamed 3.5 times more than the second most
9Tweets labeled for G (97577), M (11609) and E (6028)
using keyword sets “governor, Snyder, onethoughnerd”,
“mayor, Dayne, Walling”, and “mgr, manager, Kurtz,
Earley, Darnell”, respectively.
10This is due to our normalization factor. In normalizing Flint-
related tweets per county, instead of using true population
of counties we simply use sum of population of cities from
which at least three tweets originated and available in our
dataset.
11Location field in the Twitter user profile is used to detect
the Flinters.
12Following Twitter’s convention, we use the term friends
to refer to the users who someone follows. These Flinters
in total follow 122,953 unique accounts, and 8,339 of those
happen to be in our dataset.
blamed agent. Our first hypothesis expected him to be the
most blamed, and thus it is proved to be true.
Partisan Predisposition. We asked if those who blame
the Democratic party or ideology (D) is any different from
those who blame the Republican party or ideology (R) in
their sentimental expressions toward the governor, and the
mayor13. Fig. 3 shows that individuals blaming R have
more negative sentiment toward the governor than those
individuals who blame D. The null hypothesis that the two
samples (blaming R and blaming D) are from the same
distribution is rejected for the governor by the two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (for α = 0.001, D = 0.36, p-value
= 3.5e−6). Similarly, Fig. 3 shows that individuals blaming
R have less negative sentiment toward the mayor than those
individuals who blame D. However, due to small sample
size, we cannot statistically claim any effect of partisan
predisposition on the sentiments expressed about the mayor.
Thus, our statistical tests support H2a but not H2b.
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Figure 3: Parties blamed and their representatives.
Concerned Geographies. We expected that the cities
expressed interest in the Flint water crisis the most to be
from the county of Genesee and from the state of Michigan.
Four of the ten most concerned cities happen to be from
the county of Genesee, and six of the ten counties are from
Michigan (Tbl. 1)14.
Table 1: Residents interested in #FlintWaterCrisis.
Cities Counties
1 Flint, MI* Genesee, MI
2 Gaylord, MI Dist Columbia, DC
3 Grand Blanc, MI* Otsego, MI
4 Mount Morris, MI* Wayne, MI
5 Bloomfield Hills, MI Ingham, MI
6 Lansing, MI Washtenaw, MI
7 Sedona, AZ Multiple, GA
8 Davison, MI* Kent, MI
9 Traverse City, MI Coconino, AZ
10 Ann Arbor, MI Cook, IL
Contagion of Complaining. The friends of the Flinters
who expressed negative sentiments on the Flint water crisis
(cohort’s friends) are expected to be more negative than
the friends of those Flinters who talk positively (control’s
13When we examined the expressions toward the mayor and
the governor without separating the parties blamed, we
found out that average sentiment scores are negative for
both officials, though at different levels (-0.12, -0.31).
14The asterisk in Tbl. 1 denotes that the city is in the county
of Genesee.
friends). Fig. 4 illustrates that the mean sentiments of the
tweets of the cohort’s friends are more negative than that of
control’s friends. Furthermore, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
statistically shows that the distributions of the sentiment
scores of tweets of the two groups’ friends are significantly
different from each other with 95% confidence level (p-value
= 0.017). This discrepancy supports our hypothesis.
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Figure 4: Users and friends have similar sentiments.
6. RELATEDWORK
Complaint is defined as “an expression of dissatisfaction for
the purpose of drawing attention to a perceived misconduct
by an organization and for achieving personal or collective
goals” [7]. These goals could be personal like “anxiety re-
duction, vengeance, advice seeking, self-enhancement” or
they could be collective such as “helping others and the
organization”. While Einwiller and Stein [7] study how large
companies (“the blamed”) handle complaints on their social
media pages, in this study we are interested in the ways
citizens (“the blamers”) raise their voice against the agents
in the government as a response to the violation of a ba-
sic human right, access to clean city water. Rather than
studying marketing or public relations aspects of the blame
process, here we are interested in the other side of the coin,
how the sociology of disasters work in this process.
By studying different kinds of crises, Oltenau et al. [23]
categorize information types shared on social media during
these events. Following their topology, Flint water crisis is an
instantaneous human-induced accidental hazard diffused over
a county. It is a man-made disaster that might have started
as an accident but evolved into “a story of government failure,
intransigence, unpreparedness, delay, inaction, and environ-
mental injustice” [9]; and it is an instantaneous crisis because
no notices were given before it happened. Reviewing the ear-
lier work in the literature, [23] identify six broad categories
for information communicated over Twitter during disasters.
These information categories are i) affected individuals, ii)
infrastructure and utilities, iii) donations and volunteers, iv)
caution and advice, v) sympathy and emotional support, and
vi) other useful information. Oltenau et al. do not consider
attribution of responsibility and blame as a distinct cate-
gory; “updates about the investigation and suspects” is the
most related phenomenon mentioned, which is addressed in
the “other useful information” category (expressed vis-à-vis
shooting and bombing events).
Lin and Margolin [20] and Wen and Lin [36] examine
community-level and individual-level expressions right after
terrorist attacks respectively. Both of the studies employed
dictionary based tools (SentiSense [1] and LIWC [33]) to
measure the emotions in the tweets. Lin and Margolin
find that the extent to which residents of a city visit
the directly affected-city (Boston in their case) has the
most predictive power for the level of fear, solidarity and
sympathy expression in that city. Similarly, analysis of Wen
and Lin shows that “a greater level of anxiety was associated
with locations closer to the attack site”. One of the major
differences of our research is the phase of disaster we are
studying. Instead of studying emotions right after a terrorist
attack (i.e. during the response phase), our study focuses
on political responsibility attribution later in the recovery
phase.
Regarding the methodology, Lin and Margolin [20] make
use of two hashtags (#prayforboston and #bostonstrong) as
proxies for “empathic concern” and “solidarity”, to measure
social support. They also adapt keyword matching methods
to detect fear and joy in the tweets, two of the fourteen
sentiments defined in the SentiSense lexicon [1]. Similarly,
Wen and Lin [36] measure anxiety, sadness, and anger using
LIWC lexicon in French [33]. Here, we measure sentiments
of tweets using Vader sentiment analysis tool [12].
Although altruistic behaviors are common in times of dis-
asters [11], in the recovery phase, when the community is
pressed by difficult living conditions and when there is a lack
of short-term improvement, public increase their criticism of
administrators, and attribute blame to whom they perceive
as the agents of responsibility. Among other psychological
and social reasons discussed in Sec. 3, a political explana-
tion for this act is that in democracies the public acts as
a watchdog and actively participates in discussions to con-
trol and influence the decision makers. To this end, use of
Twitter hashtags in citizen protests has already become a
common apparatus the public leverages to grab attention to
their concerns [8]. This online activism, sometimes called
slacktivism, is defined as “as low-risk, low-cost activity via
social media, whose purpose is to raise awareness, produce
change, or grant satisfaction to the person engaged in the ac-
tivity” [27]. In this study, we are not interested in how social
media are used in physical protests or how social support is
expressed online, rather, we examine theories of attribution
of responsibility and blame in the recovery phase of a crisis
using observational data from social media.
7. CONCLUSION
In this study, building on the existing research in sociol-
ogy of disasters, we first form several theoretical hypotheses
on attribution of responsibility and blame. Then we oper-
ationalize these hypotheses on unobtrusive, observational
social media data via computational methods. The findings
support all of our hypotheses. However we should note that
we did not form our hypotheses upon conflicting views on
the topics in the first place, and they do not challenge the
findings in the literature. The nature of our hypotheses
also does not require complex or multivariate analysis. Yet,
as acknowledged by the researchers in the field, there is a
paucity of studies on the attribution of responsibility and
blame in disaster research and a need for empirical support.
This paper adds to the few number of studies on this topic.
It contributes to the sociology of disasters research also by
exploiting a new, rarely used data source (the social web),
and employing new computational methods (e.g. sentiment
analysis and retrospective cohort study design) on this new
form of data.15 In this regard, this work should be seen as
the first step toward drawing more challenging inferences on
the sociology of disasters from social media data.
15Source code and data available at github.com/oztalha/Flint.
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